Where we start
Every argument you have heard about "explainable versus accurate", "statistics versus machine learning" or "we need a model the regulator can read" is a descendant of one 33-page paper and its discussion. Six sessions read that argument and the work of three other authors who shaped the field, each at source, and test the claims on real rows instead of taking a side. Two colours run through every figure and every widget: ochre for the data modelling culture, violet for the algorithmic culture.
★ What you walk out with tonight. Breiman's distinction stated in his own words, precisely enough to classify any model you meet; the three consulting lessons that turned a probabilist into a member of the 2 percent; the hepatitis example that shows why an unchecked model's "important variables" can be fiction; and a script that fits both cultures on the same real biopsies and prints the two numbers each culture is judged by.
Nature's box, and two ways to fill it
6 min liveBreiman opens with a picture: a vector of inputs x goes into a black box, a response y comes out, and inside the box "nature functions to associate the predictor variables with the response variables". There are two goals, he says: prediction, and information about how nature makes the association. The cultures differ in what they put inside the box.
LiveThe two definitions, word for word4 min▶
The data modelling culture "starts with assuming a stochastic data model for the inside of the black box", for example that responses are generated by independent draws from response = f(predictors, random noise, parameters). The parameters are estimated from the data and the model is then used for information, prediction or both. Validation is "yes-no using goodness-of-fit tests and residual examination".
The algorithmic modelling culture "considers the inside of the box complex and unknown". Its approach is to find a function f(x), "an algorithm that operates on x to predict the responses y". Validation is "measured by predictive accuracy".
Notice what the distinction is not. It is not linear versus nonlinear, nor old versus new, nor statistics versus computer science. A logistic regression can be used in either culture: as a claim about how nature works, read off its coefficients, or as a predictor whose only credential is its score on held-out rows. Breiman's own test, from his reply to the discussants, is a single question: "are you modeling the inside of the box or not?"
The 98 and 2 percent are Breiman's estimate, printed in the figure as "Estimated culture population". Brad Efron replied in the same issue that the prediction culture, "at least around Stanford, is a lot bigger than 2%". Keep the numbers as rhetoric, not as a census.
Self-studyWhich culture are Bayesians in?2 min▶
Breiman answered this one himself: "I would include Bayesians in the data modeling culture." A prior and a likelihood are still a claim about what is inside the box. The frequentist versus Bayesian argument is a different fault line that runs through the data modelling culture, not between the two cultures, and it has its own course: Bayesian, leader session 5 ↗.
"What's the model for the data?" In the late 1970s a prominent Berkeley statistician visited Breiman in Los Angeles. Breiman described the decision tree method he had been building for clients. His friend's first question was the one above. Breiman tells the story as his first tip about what university research was like, and when he returned to Berkeley in 1980 he found that virtually every article in the flagship journals began the same way: "Assume that the data are generated by the following model".
How a probabilist ended up in the 2 percent
5 min liveBreiman spent seven years as an academic probabilist, resigned, and spent thirteen years as a free-lance consultant before joining Berkeley's statistics department. He says his views came from the problems clients paid him to solve. Two of them are in the paper in detail, and both are built around the same mechanism: set rows aside, and let them grade the model.
LiveFive perceptions he took back to the university3 min▶
Breiman lists them as the views he held when he left consulting, and they are worth reading slowly because four of them are uncontroversial and one is the whole fight:
- (a) Focus on finding a good solution, "that's what consultants get paid for".
- (b) "Live with the data before you plunge into modeling." Session 3 is about the man who made this a discipline.
- (c) Search for a model that gives a good solution, "either algorithmic or data".
- (d) "Predictive accuracy on test sets is the criterion for how good the model is."
- (e) Computers are an indispensable partner.
Item (c) is the one most people forget: he does not say "use algorithms". He says search both. Item (d) is the one the discussants fought about. D. R. Cox's reply accepts prediction as a test of a theory and then asks what happens when the prediction you need is "under quite different conditions from the data". Session 6 lets that argument run.
Self-studyThe court delay tree, and the judge who read it2 min▶
In the late 1970s Breiman studied the causes of delay in criminal trials for the Center for State Courts, using Colorado's computerised court data. The response was the time from arraignment to sentencing. He grew a large decision tree and explained it on an overhead projector to the assembled Colorado judges. One split was on District N, which had longer delays than the others. He said nothing about it. Walking out, he heard one judge say to another: "I knew those guys in District N were dragging their feet."
He uses the story to give single trees "an A+" on interpretability and "a B on prediction". Forests reverse the grades, which is the Occam dilemma of Part 3's self-study card.
The conclusions are about the model
4 min liveBreiman's sharpest sentence is a pair of truisms: "The conclusions are about the model's mechanism, and not about nature's mechanism", and so "if the model is a poor emulation of nature, the conclusions may be wrong." His worked example is a hepatitis dataset of 155 patients, where the measured accuracy of each culture decides whose list of "important variables" deserves any faith.
LiveWhy a fit test cannot rescue the model2 min▶
The data modelling culture checks its models with goodness-of-fit tests and residual plots, so the obvious reply is "check harder". Breiman's answer comes from three pieces of evidence. He once simulated a seven-dimensional regression with a controlled amount of nonlinearity, and standard goodness-of-fit tests "did not reject linearity until the nonlinearity was extreme". He cites Bickel, Ritov and Stoker: omnibus tests have little power unless the direction of the alternative is specified. And he reports William Cleveland, "one of the fathers of residual analysis", admitting at a 1993 Berkeley seminar that residual analysis could not uncover lack of fit in more than four to five dimensions.
His conclusion: "An acceptable residual plot does not imply that the model is a good fit to the data." A yes from a weak test is not evidence, and the measured error on held-out rows is the check he proposes instead. The same passage names what happens when many models pass: several equally good models give different pictures of nature. That is the Rashomon effect, and it has a session of its own in ML Epistemology, leader session 2 ↗.
Self-studyThe Occam dilemma, and how Breiman dissolves it3 min▶
Trees read well and predict moderately; forests of 50 or 100 trees predict very well and cannot be read. "So on interpretability, they rate an F." Breiman calls this the Occam dilemma, then argues it is the wrong question: "The goal is not interpretability, but accurate information." His claim, from the hepatitis and two other medical examples, is that a more accurate model gives more reliable information about which inputs matter, measured by shuffling one input at a time and counting the damage.
The claim is contested inside the same issue. Bruce Hoadley, from the credit-scoring company Fair, Isaac, replies that his segmented scorecards are "very accurate and very interpretable", and that regulators require it. Efron replies that "the whole point of science is to open up black boxes". Session 4 tests both claims on real biopsies; session 6 lets the disagreement stand.
The salary study "accepted as gospel". Breiman recalls a study, several decades before his paper, of gender discrimination in a university's faculty salaries: salary as the response, 25 variables describing academic performance, gender as a binary predictor. The gender coefficient was significant at 5 percent, and that was taken as strong evidence of discrimination. His objection was not to the conclusion but to the order of questions: "Can the data gathered answer the question posed? Is inference justified when your sample is the entire population? Should a data model be used?" The focus, he writes, "was on the model and not on the problem".
Both cultures, the same 569 biopsies
★ 22 min · everyone buildsThe data is the UCI Breast Cancer Wisconsin (Diagnostic) set: 569 fine needle aspirate biopsies, 30 measurements of the cell nuclei in each digitized image, and a diagnosis of malignant or benign. scikit-learn ships it as load_breast_cancer, which is byte-for-byte the UCI file. Seven steps fit one model from each culture on the same fixed split and print the two numbers each culture is judged by. Every output below is what the code prints.
Load the biopsies and look at the classes. 30 numeric measurements per biopsy; the label is 1 for benign and 0 for malignant, scikit-learn's convention.
Split once, stratified, and never again. Thirty percent of each class is set aside with a fixed seed. These are the same 171 rows the session 4 bench grades on.
Write down the line both cultures must clear. Calling every biopsy benign is a model too. Any score has to be read against it.
The data modelling culture: a logistic regression. Standardise on the training rows only, fit, then grade on the held-out rows. C=1.0 is scikit-learn's default penalty; the tight tolerance makes the coefficients match the bench to two decimals.
The algorithmic culture: a random forest. One hundred trees, each grown on a bootstrap of the training rows with a random subset of features tried at every split. How that works is taught in Ensemble Methods, session 2 ↗; tonight only its score and its size matter.
The second number: what each model lets you say. The regression hands you one signed number per feature. The forest hands you a count of questions nobody will read.
Where exactly do the cultures differ? Count the biopsies on which the two models give different answers, then re-run the forest with five seeds. The forest's own seed moves its score by about as much as the gap between the cultures.
Read the sign before the size. A negative coefficient here leans towards malignant, because the label codes benign as 1. The regression's largest coefficient is on worst texture, not on any of the size measurements a pathologist would name first. Session 2 finds out why, and it is not because texture matters most.
Before session 2
30 min- Read Breiman's sections 1 to 5 (about eight pages of Statistical Science 16(3)). Mark every sentence where he is describing a practice and every sentence where he is describing a person. The paper is sharper on practices.
- Classify three models you use at work with Breiman's one question: is anyone modelling the inside of the box? Write one sentence each on how the model is validated.
- Run the build-along with
random_statefrom 0 to 19 and write down the forest's lowest and highest score. Keep the range; session 4 needs it. - Print all 30 regression coefficients next to each feature's correlation with the label. Count how many point the opposite way. Bring the count.
Three questions
Clear all three and session 1 gets stamped in your passport.
1 · A team fits a logistic regression, never reads its coefficients, and judges it only by accuracy on a held-out month. Which culture are they in?
The cultures are defined by what you claim about the box and how you validate, not by the algorithm's name. The same logistic regression is a data model when its coefficients are read as nature's mechanism and checked with fit tests, and an algorithmic model when it is just a predictor graded on unseen rows.
2 · On the hepatitis data, why does Breiman distrust the logistic regression's list of important variables?
The argument runs through measured accuracy: "Weak predictive accuracy can lead to questionable conclusions." Significance was never the problem; the model's weak grip on the data was, and nobody would have noticed without a predictive check.
3 · In the build-along the regression gets 170 of 171 and the forest 167. What is the honest reading?
One dataset settles nothing about a culture. Breiman himself says "I am not against data models per se", and the best model "could be an algorithmic model, or maybe a data model, or maybe a combination". Session 4 moves the levers and watches the ordering change.
What this session teaches, and where it came from
Every fact on this page, and its verification tier, is recorded in the course's source map.
Session 1 cheat sheet · pin this
The regression you just fitted is 99.4 percent right on unseen biopsies, and several of its coefficients point the wrong way. Session 2 reads George Box, who wrote in 1976 that "all models are wrong" and in 1979 put the famous sentence in a section heading, and turns "some are useful" into three checks you can run on a model you already have.